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I. Background
The vast majority of Somalis who have remained in their country continue to rely on remittance money sent from abroad. Although smaller
waves of immigration have occurred for many years,1 prolonged
political and economic turmoil coupled with periods of violence and
humanitarian crisis have caused the number of Somali immigrants to
spike in the last twenty years. This population outflow has resulted
in an extensive diaspora network across the globe, with communities
established across the Greater Horn of Africa, the Gulf States, North
America, and Europe. Estimates on the size of the Somali diaspora
range from 1–1.5 million people globally,2 or approximately 14 percent
of Somalia’s total population.
These diaspora communities have traditionally remained actively
engaged on Somali political and economic developments from their
adopted countries. One of the diaspora’s primary ties to the homeland
comes in the form of remittances—money that is sent on a regular
basis to family and friends in Somalia. These funds have often been
called a lifeline for the Somali people, covering the costs of needs such
as food, education, and health care.3 Although the exact scale of remittance flows is difficult to pinpoint, estimates have ranged from $750
million to $1.6 billion annually and these funds account for nearly 60
percent of the Somali recipients’ average annual incomes.4
*Bildhaan is grateful for the permission to republish this article.

66

Danielle Cotter and Tracey Durner

Remittance transactions are processed by money service businesses
(MSBs), also known as hawalas, which provide access to financial services across Somalia in places where formal banking systems do not
exist. International financial institutions provide “holding accounts”
for MSBs to deposit funds from senders before they are wired to the
payout locations where they will reach recipients. Due to the rapid
turnover in MSB bank accounts and the varying customer due diligence (CDD) standards in the jurisdictions that receive the transferred
funds, MSBs have come under increased global scrutiny in recent years
and been identified as an area of vulnerability for criminal use, including terrorist financing. In response to tightened anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations and
the imposition of high penalties for noncompliance, there has been a
rising trend among financial institutions to exit relationships with clients deemed “high risk”—including many of the Somali MSBs.
Somalis are not the only remitting community confronted with this
problem, but de-risking has proven to be particularly pervasive for
the Somali community in terms of both targeting and impact. In 2001
the U.S. government shut down the operations of al-Barakaat—which,
before the attacks of September 11, was the largest MSB serving Somalis—because of suspicions that it had been used as a channel to funnel
money to al-Qaida. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s finding that hawalas
including al-Barakaat were not used to fund the 9/11 operation itself,5
some unrelated incidents in which individuals of Somali origin were
found to have funneled money for terrorist purposes through MSBs
received significant media attention.6 Financial institutions are thus
increasingly wary of engaging with MSBs, and in recent years a number of banks, including Sunrise Community Bank, Barclays Bank, and
Westpac Bank, have begun closing remittance accounts.
Beyond providing vital sustenance funding to relatives in Somalia,
many diaspora members see remittances as part of their social obligation and a way to contribute toward financial stability and the rebuilding of their communities despite the geographical distance.7 While
other diaspora populations must also scramble to identify new financial institutions following account closures, humanitarian concerns
and the absence of a financial infrastructure compound the urgency of
the problem for the many people in Somalia who are largely reliant on
remittance funds. Due in part to the negative media attention resulting
from the terrorism financing cases involving hawalas that serve the
Somali community, many in the Somali diaspora perceive the discrim-
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ination by financial institutions against them to be greater than that
faced by other diaspora communities.
With these vital funds at risk, it has become increasingly important
to understand specific remittance corridors and sending practices in
order to design appropriate policy that encourages financial inclusion and economic integration, and provides incentives for banks to
maintain these crucial relationships.8 Although the United Kingdom
remains the primary European destination for Somali immigration,
Denmark has seen a spike in the number of Somali refugees seeking
asylum in recent years—rising from just 66 applications lodged in 2009
to 769 in 2013.9 Denmark’s current Somali diaspora population, which
includes both well-established members and recent arrivals, is estimated at 19,508.10 A large percentage of the diaspora send remittances
to Somalia, with Oxfam America estimating that in 2007, $45 million
was sent annually from nearly 13,000 senders in Denmark.11
While there is much literature and news coverage available on
Somali remittance linkages to other diaspora communities across
North America and Western Europe, the body of literature available
on challenges and opportunities for the Danish-Somali remittance corridor is comparatively small.12 With a large portion of the Somali diaspora in Denmark sending remittances and increasing global scrutiny
on AML/CFT practices, the regulatory climate for MSBs in Denmark
has become an important component of Somali diaspora relations. In
July 2014, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), known
as the Finanstilsynet,13 released a statement that Dahab Shiil Money
Transfer Service Ltd.’s operations within Denmark have not been in
full compliance with Danish AML legislation following an inspection
and investigation that began in July 2013. The FSA has since ordered
the company to establish procedures for the reporting of suspicious
customer activity in line with Danish AML legislation and to “cease to
have agents” outside its main office in Copenhagen.14 With inquiries
into Dahab Shiil’s operational compliance ongoing, it is likely that
investigations will also spread to other Somali MSBs operating in Denmark. In the absence of a clear delineation and mutual understanding
of roles and responsibilities between regulators and MSB operators,
the experiences of account closures in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia run the risk of being repeated in Denmark.
This policy brief examines Somali remittance practices in Denmark
and the operations of Somali MSBs. Additionally, it offers insights into
Somali perceptions of diaspora relations in Denmark in order to better
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understand the underlying socio-political considerations related to the
existing regulatory climate for MSBs. Research for this policy brief was
conducted through a desk review of the English language literature
on the topic as well as selected translations in Danish and Somali,
and field interviews with government actors, private sector representatives, and community leaders in three Danish cities: Aalborg, Aarhus,
and Copenhagen. The brief
1. Provides contextual background of the remittance climate and
Somali diaspora relations in Denmark,
2. Discusses general trends in MSB operations in Denmark, as well as
perceptions of those operations, and
3. Concludes with recommendations for key actors related to regulation.
II. MSB Operations in Denmark
Danish regulations for MSBs are aimed at allowing the safe passage of
remittances while also countering money laundering/terrorism financing threats. The FSA of Denmark is the entity responsible for “supervising compliance with financial legislation by financial undertakings
(enterprises).” According to the Danish Financial Business Act, it has
the authority to issue licenses15 to such institutions within Denmark.
Within the FSA there is a specific “governance, anti-money laundering
and payment services” division16 to handle the operations of MSBs
operating under Danish jurisdiction.
The FSA provides a comprehensive public listing of the enterprises
under its supervision. To be licensed by the FSA as an independent
and stand-alone hawala within Denmark, MSBs are listed as “payment
services area” institutions “with restricted authorization.”17 The list
currently includes four Somali MSBs: Amal Express Financial Service,
Dahab Shiil Money Transfer Service ApS, Iftin Express, and the Somali
Welfare Association. According to one interviewee, another company
has submitted an application for a license and will receive one pending
final approval from the FSA. Many of these companies were only registered in recent years, between June 2010 and July 2012.18 The “restricted
authorization” permits these businesses receive are in accordance with
the Payment Services and Electronic Money Act, which lists money
remittances as payment services in Annex 1, subsection 6.19 Section
38, subsection 2 of the law pertains to MSBs, qualifying them to be
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licensed as long as the “preceding 12 months’ average total amount of
(their) payment transactions . . . (does not) exceed EUR 3 million per
month.”20 Section 38, subsection 2 of the Payment Services and Electronic Money Act also covers the operations of agents of MSBs, with
the line: “any agent for which the undertaking assumes full liability.”21
In Denmark, Somali MSB agents operate in two ways. Somali communities in Danish cities are small22 compared to the communities in
London,23 Minneapolis,24 and Toronto.25 Because of this, many of the
registered MSBs in Denmark may only have one main office, which
is often in Copenhagen. To serve customers in other areas where the
Somali diaspora is present, such as Aarhus, Aalborg, Kolding, and
Odense, they contract agents in each of these cities to serve as representatives and employees of their MSB. These agents gain access to
the Danish MSB branch’s bank account so they can transfer the money
from their location to the main office in Copenhagen. From there, the
funds leave Denmark for their intended recipients in Somalia or other
locations in the Greater Horn of Africa.
These agents also operate as employees of MSBs that are not independently licensed in Denmark. These MSBs do not have official
branches in Denmark, but are instead affiliated with more recognizable and well-known MSBs—often not Somali-specific in affiliation—
that serve as their parent companies, including Euronet Payment
Services, MoneyGram, Western Union, and Xpress Money Services
Limited. According to the Danish FSA’s website, there are 666 of these
registered MSB “agents” in Denmark listed under the “payment services area.”26 This number is inclusive of all MSBs rather than those
that serve the Somali community alone. The companies with which
they are affiliated are obligated to comply with the Danish AML Act as
per their licensing, and are thus responsible for ensuring the AML/CFT
compliance of their agents.27
III. Selected Perceptions from MSB Operators
During field interviews, the research team spoke with a limited but
diverse selection of community members and Somali MSB operators in
Aalborg, Aarhus, and Copenhagen about their perceptions of the MSB
industry in Denmark and their experience operating in the Danish regulatory environment. Individual remittance transactions often average
between $100 and $300. Breakdowns of the final destinations for remittance funds varied by MSB, but one representative estimated that 80
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percent of remittances sent through their MSB in Denmark were going
to Somalia, with the remaining 20 percent going to Somali communities in East African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
All of those interviewed emphatically stressed the importance of compliance with Danish AML legislation in order to keep their licenses
or to maintain their agent status under other businesses, though they
described their view of the law as being “very strict.”28
Adequate compliance with this relatively new legislation involves
increased operating costs and a substantial time commitment, requiring MSBs to keep extensive records, conduct regular audits, and provide ongoing AML/CFT training for staff. In highlighting the change in
MSB prospects since the updates to the Danish AML law, one former
MSB operator joked that in order to own an MSB branch and stay
abreast of all of the regulatory requirements, one needs an advanced
banking degree.29 In addition to being licensed by Denmark, many
MSBs also must be licensed by their business’ headquarters, which
involves its own set of compliance and training requirements. While
interviewees acknowledged the value of the principles they learned
at these trainings, these dual requirements force MSBs to dedicate
significant resources to training programs for their Denmark-based
employees. Oftentimes, a company’s compliance officer will travel
from headquarters to all of the jurisdictions in which the MSB operates
to provide in-depth trainings on CDD and reporting guidelines and
requirements, limiting the compliance officer’s desk time in the company’s home office.30
MSB representatives also indicated that the record-keeping requirements are a time-consuming process that is difficult to conduct with
limited staff capacities. Some MSB operators struggled with the
amount of information they are required to aggregate, retain, and then
provide to regulators for each transaction by customers who “they
know” and “who know them.” There remained a view among some
that their primary responsibility in terms of compliance is to collect
relevant identification information from customers and share this with
regulatory authorities, rather than proactively monitor for suspicious
activity or ask too many questions about the source of funds.31
Interviewees generally noted a shift in the viability of hawalas as a
long-term source of revenue for owners. Representatives of several
companies indicated that the cost of compliance is making it more
expensive to process and send remittances, lowering their profits on
each transaction and often resulting in their barely breaking even. The
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MSB owners who were interviewed for this research noted that hawala
organizations should not be conceived of as small for-profit businesses
but, rather, as the embodiment of the obligation of Somali diaspora
communities across the world to their homeland. Even though one
representative emphasized that some hawala operators are looking to
exit the Danish market, he noted that other individuals within the
community would step up to fill that absence due to this sense of
responsibility. This duty is also honored equally by the Danish sending
community; according to one interviewee, even when senders in Denmark have no available money, they borrow or apply for a personal
loan in order to send their monthly remittance payments to Somalia. The significance of this practice as a cornerstone of Somali social
responsibility is important to consider when discussing the regulatory
structures for MSBs. Hawala owners in particular may view increased
AML/CFT scrutiny as suspicion directed at the Somali community,
rather than a practice applied to all MSBs operating around the world.
Despite the current prevalence of remittances, many interviewees
expressed concern that a form of remittance decay32—a decreasing volume of funds sent by Somalis in Denmark to Somalia—is on the horizon for the community as the Danish-born Somali generation reaches
employment age.33 Many second generation Somalis have never visited their homeland and no longer have nuclear family members living in that country. They feel less connected to their homeland and
identify more with Danish society—a factor that could reduce their
willingness to send remittances in the future. Additionally, interviewees suggested that the second generation has come to view remittances as a negative practice, creating a culture of dependency that is
not beneficial to rebuilding Somalia. According to some interviewees,
many of the younger generation have indicated a preference to supporting development and investment opportunities as opposed to the
traditional person-to-person remittance structures. Examples include
remittances for school fees, business development, and as rewards for
educational achievement. The shift in the purpose of remittances also
has had an impact on sending practices, with senders moving away
from small, regular contributions to more infrequent and larger contributions. As the Danish community seeks to regulate the industry,
transaction amounts and frequency become important variables, as
these transactions are currently viewed as “irregular” and may be otherwise flagged as suspicious.34
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In terms of sending trends and patterns, MSB operators explained
that every three months they observe an influx of remittance traffic
coinciding with the schedule of Danish welfare and child support
payments. MSBs and community leaders also raised the common
occurrence of hagbad-type scenarios, in which groups—often led by
women—collect funds to serve as a pooled savings account in which
available funds are rotated among participating individuals. Interviewees noted that welfare associations such as the Somali Welfare
Association collect money from diaspora members and send one lump
sum payment to Somalia to save on transaction costs.35 These examples
complement the trend of diaspora members in Denmark choosing to
finance more expensive endeavors rather than smaller-scale remittance
payments to individuals.
IV. Diaspora Relations: A Somali Perspective
Denmark is considered an attractive and welcoming place for immigrants, offering a generous and supportive social welfare system with
high levels of public provision for health care, education, and unemployment benefits that are accessible to all citizens and residents. In
2014, Denmark spent 30 percent of its annual GDP on social expenditures, well above the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) average of 21 percent.36 Somali refugees in particular remain, however, one of the least integrated minority groups in
Denmark. For example, in 2010 only 34 percent of men and 22 percent
of Somali women were employed, due in large part to limited education and language difficulties.37
As an increasing number of Somalis settle in Denmark and a second
generation is born and raised there, more attention has been paid to
the relationship between the Danish government and the Somali diaspora. Denmark is a small country with a relatively homogeneous population and a strong national identity,38 and the recent rise in Somali
immigration has led to growing concern about its impact as well as the
challenges of refugee integration. This concern has manifested itself
in the tightening of asylum legislation, which has been perceived by
some as a method of preserving “Danish culture.”39 These shifting
cultural perceptions may have an impact on the ongoing development of Somali diaspora relations in Denmark, and here the research
team provides a brief snapshot of some of the key issues that surfaced
during interviews with 15 diaspora members. While these cannot be
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taken as representative of the entire Somali experience in Denmark,
they provide some insight into the underlying socio-political elements
of diaspora relations that offer a useful context in which to frame the
AML/CFT policymaking and regulatory frameworks.
The Danish government has strict requirements for citizenship,
which many Somalis interviewed see as a strategy to preserve the
homogeneity of Danish society. In order to become a citizen, one must
have a permanent residency permit, proof of residency for nine years,
and cannot have received public assistance under the Active Social
Policy Act or the Integration Act within the last year or for more than
30 months in the past five years. Applicants also cannot have any
outstanding public debt or have been sentenced to prison terms of 18
months or for more than 60 days for a violation of Penal Code chapters 12 and 13, which are related to terrorism.40 The requirements that
were most frequently cited by the Somalis interviewed for this study,
however, were related to the language and citizenship test requirements. The Danish government requires foreign nationals to pass a
Danish language exam, the Danish Test 2 or its equivalent, as well as
a citizenship test that emphasizes aspects of daily and active political life. Finally, applicants must also sign a declaration of allegiance
and loyalty to Denmark and Danish society.41 Previously, Denmark
had required applicants to renounce their prior citizenship, but has
recently relaxed those requirements for refugees—although renouncing is still encouraged for other non-refugee applications.42
Somali interviewees in Denmark found these requirements to be
challenging for their community, particularly as those interviewed did
not perceive inherent benefits in obtaining citizenship given that it
was not a prerequisite for welfare assistance. The only benefit that
was noted consistently was the ability to travel more freely and to
potentially relocate to other countries within the EU, including the
United Kingdom, which is viewed as a “more Somali friendly community.”43 The disconnect between residency and citizenship has arguably contributed to the Somali diaspora’s continued identification as
Somali over Danish. This identification, coupled with the community’s
heavy engagement in political and economic affairs in Somalia, has
also encouraged the development of a perceived divide between the
Somali diaspora and the Danish citizenry. This divide has been further
exacerbated by the rise of right-wing political groups in Denmark.
Some indicated that many Somalis feel that they are not accepted by
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society, and as a result have been largely excluded from participation
in both the labor market and in Danish civil and political institutions.44
The Danish government has worked to engage with diaspora organizations on social and political issues, including providing support
for diaspora-led relief, rehabilitation, and development projects in
Somalia. One key example is the establishment of the Danish Refugee Council Diaspora Programme funded by the Danish aid agency
DANIDA. This fund, established for Somali and Afghan refugees, provides financial support and offers training programs on the design,
planning, and implementation of development projects. To date, it has
supported projects such as midwifery training, the construction of a
water pipeline, and childhood education initiatives in Somalia, among
others.45 One Somali interviewee who had participated in the application process indicated, however, that even this program was very
complex and required a high degree of Danish language proficiency as
well as experience developing programs within the Danish context.46
The research team also noted challenges in identifying credible
and sustainable diaspora organizations. There is no clear process for
establishment, and many of these groups are informal organizations
developed according to Somali clan structures. This lack of structure
presents challenges for the Danish government’s efforts to engage, as
the diaspora has yet to establish a clear and unified voice with which
to advocate for diaspora issues within the country. This difficulty was
illustrated at the recent High Level Partnership Forum Copenhagen,
a recent conference organized to maintain momentum in the political
transition process established through the New Deal Conference in
2013.47 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark limited event participants to 335 people, with only 205 allowed in the same room as the
President of the Federal Government of Somalia, due to security and
facilitation concerns. This number is, however, much lower than similar events held in London and Minneapolis.48 There was also an online
registration requirement for the conference, which many felt was discriminatory against the Somali diaspora in Denmark, who often have
low levels of general literacy and/or lack computer access.49 Diaspora
organization representatives who met with the research team saw these
events as another example of the Danish government’s unwillingness
to engage with the community or accept them as positive stakeholders,
further contributing to feelings of alienation.
In isolated instances, challenges including the difficulties in starting
a new life in Denmark and the increasingly xenophobic tone of right-
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wing politicians have contributed to members of the Somali diaspora
community in Denmark leaning toward radical Islamism.50 In May
2012, two Danish brothers of Somali origin were arrested on suspicions
of plotting a terrorist attack. Both had been residents of Denmark for
over fifteen years, yet one was suspected of having undergone training
at an al-Shabaab camp in Somalia.51 Although the crime was not perpetrated by Somali nationals, tensions also escalated with the exposure
of a plot to murder staff of a Danish newspaper that had published
controversial cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.52
These recent incidents, coupled with the rising fear of returning foreign fighters across the European Union, have renewed concerns about
the vulnerability of the Danish-Somali remittance corridor to terrorist
financing abuse. As the Danish government develops policy and regulatory frameworks to counter these vulnerabilities, it is important that
it also work to ensure that these measures do not further alienate the
diaspora community but, rather, are designed to support and foster
balanced financial inclusion and regulatory goals.
V. Recommendations
Following the FSA investigation’s finding that the compliance mechanisms of one licensed MSB in Denmark were inadequate, the operations of other MSB branches and agents in Denmark will likely be
subject to increased scrutiny in the near future. Multilateral engagement among government regulators, Somali MSBs, and financial institutions holding MSB bank accounts to raise sector-wide awareness
of AML/CFT legislation and expectations, demonstrate MSB prioritization of compliance, and improve communication will be a proactive step toward preventing worst-case scenarios such as MSB bank
account closures or MSB operation freezes. This policy brief provides a
preliminary list of recommendations for stakeholders in the MSB system in Denmark:
Danish governmental AML/CFT regulatory bodies should
• Translate new Danish AML law and guidance notes into Somali,
issue official English translations of these documents, and circulate
these translated versions among MSBs to alleviate the language barrier identified by interviewees.
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• Conduct an MSB sector assessment to identify trends and favor a
risk-based approach.
• Conduct due diligence to identify credible and sustainable diaspora
organizations and improve communication with these organizations to demonstrate support and willingness to engage.
• Develop databases for dual citizenship identification to support
CDD efforts.
• Issue guidance targeted at MSBs to aid in Suspicious Transaction
Report (STR) submission and the implementation of CDD requirements (for example, the origins of the funds being remitted).
• Cooperate with financial institutions holding MSB accounts on how
to maintain the accounts of their high-risk customers and encourage
their compliance.
• Offer clarification on the differences in licensing for agents, employees, subagents, and main offices and their operations and legality
within Denmark.
Somali MSBs should
• Submit STRs from Danish branches and agents to regulators and
also provide this information to the international headquarters of
their companies.
• When submitting STRs to regulators, provide the multiple iterations
of spellings of customer names or potential aliases, nicknames, or
abbreviations to assist regulators in conducting CDD.
• Select a community spokesperson who represents the majority’s
views and offers a unified voice for the Somali community in interactions with Danish government officials on pressing issues affecting the diaspora.
• Form a remittance union similar to the UK Somali Money Services
Association and elect a leadership to represent the community in
discussions with regulators such as the FSA.
• Work with trusted interlocutors such as nongovernmental organizations or community leaders to organize trainings for their branches
and agents specific to compliance with the Danish AML act.
• Forge alliances with MSBs serving other diaspora groups in Denmark.
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• Maintain open lines of communication and conduct advocacy
efforts with banks in Denmark that hold Somali MSB bank accounts
to ensure that these financial institutions do not drop the accounts.
• Strengthen information technology systems for Danish branches
and agents and hire IT consultants who will maintain current website information—for example, updated lists of agent contact information in each of the cities in Denmark—and who will fortify public
websites and internal IT systems against phishing attempts.
Financial institutions in Denmark holding bank accounts of Somali MSBs
should
• Avoid a “derisking” approach and instead conduct thorough risk
assessments of perceived “high risk customers” to determine what
actions could be taken to enhance the working relationship with
these customers instead of dropping their accounts.
• Improve communication with any identified high-risk customers,
and if the decision is made to close their bank accounts, provide
them with enough advance notice to make alternate arrangements.
• Encourage cooperation and information sharing with the FSA and
the Danish State Prosecutor’s Office for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK) in relation to open cases.
• Identify and emulate the best practices of institutions that have successfully maintained relationships with and the bank accounts of
high-risk customers.
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